Estimated NIL & NCAA Revenue Sharing 2025-26:
As part of the House v. NCAA settlement, schools are allowed to share athletic department revenues with their student athletes beginning on July 1, 2025. We estimate that NCAA Division I athletes will receive over $ 2.2 billion in total NIL and Revenue Sharing compensation during the current 2025-26 academic year:
| Revenue Sharing & NIL Estimates 2025-26 | Payments to Athletes | % |
|---|---|---|
| NCAA Revenue Sharing | $ 1,747,000,000 | 78% |
| Commercial NIL * | 292,000,000 | 13% |
| NIL Collectives * | 205,000,000 | 9% |
| Totals | $ 2,244,000,000 | 100% |
Revenue Sharing: Under the NCAA revenue sharing model, schools can elect to make payments directly to athletes up to $ 20.5 million per year. If a school also commits to increased scholarships than the amount of revenue sharing is reduced dollar for dollar up to $ 2.5 million. So the net revenue sharing cash outlay will likely be $ 18 million for most power conference schools. The annual cap will increase to around $ 32 million over the next ten years. The following table summarizes how we arrived at the current year estimated total of $ 1.75 billion:
NCAA Revenue
Sharing 2025-26NCAA I
Schools# of Schools
Participating Estimated
PaymentsAverage ($)
per School
FBS - Power 4 Schools 68 68 $ 1,394,000,000 $ 20,500,000
FBS - Group of 6 Schools 68 65 216,001,507 3,323,100
FCS Conference Schools 129 101 93,872,723 929,433
NCAA I Schools w/o Football 99 76 43,339,143 570,252
Totals 364 310 $ 1,747,213,373
Indications are that virtually all Power 4 schools will max out at the $ 20.5 million cap for 2025-26. Our estimates assume that all other participating NCAA I schools will make payments averaging 22% of annual operating revenue. These are averages … some schools will pay a higher percentage and many will elect to pay lower. Of the current total of 364 NCAA I members, 54 schools have indicated to date that they will not participate in revenue sharing, this includes the three Division I service academies, the eight Ivy League schools and 43 others.
Football and Men’s basketball account for close to 90% of team specific revenues at most Power Conference schools, and athletes on these two teams will be the major beneficiaries of revenue sharing:
| Estimated Revenue Sharing Power Conference Schools | Revenue Sharing % | Allocation to Team ($) | # of eligible Athletes * | Average per Athlete ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 | ||||
| Football | 75% | $ 15,375,000 | 105 | $ 146,428 |
| Men's Basketball | 15% | 3,075,000 | 15 | 205,000 |
| All Other Sports | 10% | 2,050,000 | 456 | 4,495 |
| Totals 2025-26 | 100% | $ 20,500,000 | 576 |
* Eligible athletes are based on the new NCAA I roster limits. These are averages per athlete … a few players per team will receive substantially higher than the average, while many will receive much less. Football teams are allocated the most money, but men’s basketball has the highest average per player due to much smaller rosters. Our tables below detail the new NCAA I scholarship and roster limits as well as estimated revenue sharing for all other sports.
* Commercial NIL: In addition to school revenue sharing payments, student athletes can continue to receive third-party NIL income for product endorsements, services and other compensation for use of their name, image and likeness. All third-party NIL contracts over $ 600 must be submitted to the College Sports Commission for approval. The estimate for 2025-26 Commercial NIL comes from the Opendorse NIL at Four report.
* NIL Collectives: With the advent of Revenue Sharing, the influence of collectives at most schools has greatly diminished. NIL collectives are also considered third-party entities and contracts exceeding $ 600 must be submitted to the College Sports Commission for approval. The estimate for 2025-26 NIL Collectives also comes from the Opendorse NIL at Four report.
NCAA basketball – average NIL & Revenue Sharing payments per team
Let’s take a look at how this works in practice. Here are estimated 2025-26 roster costs for NCAA I basketball teams. Most large player contracts are a combination of third-party NIL and revenue sharing:
Estimated NCAA Basketball
Team Roster Cost 2025-26 * Average Cost of
Team Roster ($)Portion paid via
third-party NIL Portion paid via
Revenue Sharing
SEC $ 9,700,000 $ 7,100,000 $ 2,600,000
Big 12 8,600,000 4,400,000 4,200,000
Big Ten 8,500,000 5,400,000 3,100,000
ACC 8,200,000 4,100,000 4,100,000
Big East 8,000,000 2,300,000 5,700,000
Mid to High Majors 2,300,000 1,000,000 1,300,000
Low to Mid Majors 525,000 100,000 425,000
* These estimates were compiled by a confidential survey of NCAA I basketball coaches conducted by the Athletic. Some notes on these estimates:
- The SEC has the highest average per team primarily due to Kentucky’s reported $ 22 million roster cost.
- There was a WIDE range of team roster costs – the SEC and ACC both have differences of over $ 10 million between some teams.8
- The Big East has the highest percentage of revenue sharing allocated to basketball since with the exception of UConn, no other Big East school has an FBS football program accounting for a significant amount of team specific revenue.8
- Revenue sharing began July 1, 2025 – this is also the starting date requiring submission of third-party NIL payments to the College Sports Commission for approval. Consequently, many collectives fully distributed their funds prior to July 1 to avoid having to submit these payments to the CSC for approval. Consequently, 2025 may represent a high-water mark for roster funding via NIL and 2026-27 roster costs could be lower.
The million-dollar question is will these pricey wagers buy basketball success? It will be interesting to see how Kentucky (with reportedly the most expensive roster) ends up when March Madness arrives in March 2026. One high-major coach told this to CBS Sports about the current NIL spending spree in general: “The guys aren’t worth the money they’re going for. I could spend $15 million, but the roster I’d put together wouldn’t win a national championship. There are bad players going for big money.”
Significant non-compliance with NIL reporting requirements?
I don’t want to say something is rotten in Denmark, but something isn’t adding up on NIL compliance. As outlined in the House v NCAA settlement, every third-party NIL deal over $ 600 is required to be submitted to the College Sports Commission for approval. However, the total value of deals submitted via the NIL Go portal appears to be only a fraction of what is reportedly being paid for NIL. This raises the issue of potentially significant non-compliance with NIL reporting requirements. Additionally, there is some opposition from at least a few schools to the CSC participation agreement as currently drafted.
The latest update from the College Sports Commission reports only $ 87.5 million of cleared deals as of 11/1/2025, this is a fraction of the estimated $ 500 million third-party NIL market just for basketball alone. Some of the difference can be attributable to the NIL Collective “money dump” prior to the July 1 start of CSC enforcement, but this still leaves a boatload of missing money. I’m definitely not the accountant with the sharpest pencil around, but unless there is a massive amount of pending deals in the NIL Go system, even I can see that these numbers don’t seem to add up. Stay tuned …
Estimated Revenue Sharing by FBS Conference:
Here is how our estimate of 2025 revenue sharing per participating school breaks down by FBS conference:
Estimated Revenue
Sharing per School# of Schools
Participating
Avr Revenue
per School *Est Revenue
Sharing 2025
SEC 16 136,953,192 20,500,000
Big Ten 18 133,217,638 20,500,000
ACC 17 97,146,144 20,500,000
Big 12 16 66,596,824 20,500,000
Pac 12 2 n/a **
Mountain West 11 22,815,885 5,019,495
American 12 17,644,874 3,881,872
Sun Belt 14 11,112,224 2,444,689
Mid-American 13 9,646,224 2,122,169
Conference USA 12 9,224,151 2,029,313
FBS Independents
2 n/a 19,250,000
FCS Schools 101 4,224,695 929,433
NCAA I Schools w/o Football 76 2,592,054 570,252
Totals 310
* Our estimates assume that all Power 4 schools will max out at the $ 20.5 million cap, and that all other NCAA I schools electing into revenue sharing will make payments averaging 22% of annual operating revenue. However, schools can pay out any percentage for revenue sharing so long as they don’t exceed the annual cap. Consequently, revenue sharing may produce a “Moneyball” upstart.
** We are not making an estimate of 2025 revenue sharing for the Pac-12 as it is currently in transition. However, the new Pac-12 may end up becoming the Sweet Spot conference in the revenue sharing era.
*
All NCAA I athletic departments are incurring significant operating losses even before the effect of Revenue Sharing:
All FBS school athletic departments incur significant annual net operating losses. Power conference schools use big athletic department contributions to fund most of their operating losses, while other schools must rely heavily on direct school support and student fees:
| 2024 Annual Operating Results ($) Average per FBS Conference School | Operating Revenue * | Operating Expenses | Net Loss from Operations ($) | Contributions | School Support & Student Fees | Net Surplus (Deficit) ** | % of expenses paid by School & Student Fees |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | | | | | | |
||
| SEC | 136,953,192 | 212,456,935 | - 75,503,743 | 71,471,945 | 7,384,223 | 3,352,425 | 3% | |
| Big Ten | 133,217,638 | 188,462,418 | - 55,244,780 | 42,720,351 | 6,300,995 | - 6,223,434 | 3% | |
| ACC | 97,146,144 | 151,816,480 | - 54,670,336 | 44,989,295 | 19,468,254 | 9,787,213 | 13% | |
| Pac-12 (2023-24 line-up) | 84,729,961 | 145,208,875 | - 60,478,914 | 28,495,200 | 19,732,564 | - 12,251,150 | 14% | |
| Big 12 | 66,596,824 | 114,812,794 | - 48,215,970 | 30,590,592 | 15,520,650 | - 2,104,728 | 14% | |
| Mountain West | 22,815,885 | 64,509,764 | - 41,693,879 | 10,691,232 | 28,137,573 | - 2,865,074 | 44% | |
| American | 17,644,874 | 62,418,964 | - 44,774,090 | 9,393,008 | 37,538,407 | 2,157,325 | 60% | |
| Sun Belt | 11,112,224 | 46,933,285 | - 35,821,061 | 5,993,678 | 25,624,583 | - 2,759,053 | 55% | |
| Mid-American | 9,646,224 | 36,059,723 | - 26,413,499 | 2,857,756 | 23,623,351 | 67,708 | 66% | |
| Conference USA | 9,224,151 | 36,039,621 | - 26,815,470 | 3,498,364 | 22,466,196 | - 850,910 | 62% | |
 | ||||||||
* Athletic Department operating revenue includes ticket sales, game guarantees, TV and media contracts, licensing, advertising, sponsorships and royalties, bowl game, NCAA and conference distributions, and other operating income. Operating Revenue does not include direct or indirect school support, student fees or contributions to the athletic department.
** Average operating results from fiscal year 2024 NCAA reporting.
What do net operating losses have to do with Revenue Sharing?
College Athletic Departments are already losing money and the cash needed to fund revenue sharing and related costs – close to $ 30 million annually at most power conference schools – has to come from somewhere. Boosters are being aggressively marketed for increased contributions to help cover these costs. However, revenue sharing will likely result in increased parity between Power Conference schools and as a result, potentially a lot of unhappy boosters. Revenue sharing may also result in booster fatigue at many schools.
So at almost all schools, revenue sharing will likely require the infusion of either additional school support and/or increased student fees, and this is a sticky issue. For example, James Madison University has made a remarkable transition from the FCS level and is contending for a FBS playoff bid this season. However JMU also charges the highest amount of athletic fees of any school – over $ 55 million per most recent reporting. This works out to $ 2,456 per student for the 2025-26 school year and is mandatory … whether a student has any interest in athletics or not. In JMU’s defense, they are very transparent about where student fees go, and the school’s internal funding of athletics is comparable to many of its competitors. Direct school support to athletic departments ultimately comes from students either via tuition payments or specifically designated student fees.
Funding revenue sharing is one of the reasons the Big Ten is considering a $ 2.4 billion private equity deal
Occam’s Razor is the centuries old principle of logic that states that the simplest explanation is most often the one closest to the truth. A few insiders associated with the proposed equity deal are touting undefined benefits to “long-term value” and “brand enhancement”. But the simplest reason this proposal has many Big Ten members salivating is a reported up-front cash distribution of around $ 150 million per school.
However, with Big Ten schools running average net operating losses of $ 55 million annually (and at least one member running a $ 100 million annual loss) before the additional costs of revenue sharing, the $ 150 million payday loan equivalent will be quickly used up at most schools. The equity deal is a short-term band aid and doesn’t address the issue of runaway athletic department costs. It could however, result in long-term injury to collegiate athletics.
A Big Ten equity deal will result in an aggressive push for a disastrous College “Super League”
One of the few certainties in life is that if a private equity fund invests over $ 2 billion in any venture, they are expecting a lucrative return. In the proposed Big Ten Equity deal, the payout will be based on significantly enhancing the value of the Conference’s media rights. And it’s pretty clear how they intend to do so:
Current Big Ten Media Distribution: $ 75 million per School
Current NFL Media Distribution: $ 433 million per Team
So how do you get a media deal anywhere close to the NFL numbers? Simply by forming a college “super league” that operates similar to the NFL. And like any professional league, the schedule would only be games between league teams … “marquee” matchups every week would be one of the key selling points. There are currently 136 FBS schools so most would be excluded. You hear talk of maybe 60 or 70 schools being in the proposed league, but these numbers are probably overstated. To make sense operationally and to maximize revenue, the super league would likely end up closer to the current NFL size of 32 teams – which means 104 FBS schools would be left out in the cold. Additionally, many of the 129 FCS schools would also be adversely affected as they would lose the game guarantee revenues and visibility of playing an elite FBS program once a year.
An NFL style college super league would be a pure and simple money grab and would likely destroy intercollegiate athletics. A handful of big budget athletic programs would benefit immensely, while the vast majority of current NCAA I schools would be adversely affected. It would also negatively impact many if not most of the 170,000 student athletes who currently compete at the Division I level, including potential loss of athletic scholarships and revenue sharing opportunities.
However, the worst result of a college super league is that it would significantly benefit a handful of “elite” universities – those with undergrad enrollments increasingly composed of out of state students paying higher tuition, while negatively impacting the schools that actually do the best job of providing an affordable college education to students across the country.
We already have an affordability issue and a troubling decline in US college enrollment nationwide, let’s not make it worse.
Estimated Revenue Sharing by Sport:
We compiled data from NCAA membership reporting of 20 Power Conference schools, and arrived at the following estimated revenue sharing allocations per team for the upcoming 2025-26 year:
| Estimated Revenue Sharing Power School Averages | Team | Average Per Team | Average Roster * | Average Per Athlete | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Football | M | 15,345,899 | 105 | 146,151 | 75.0% |
| Basketball | M | 3,279,161 | 15 | 218,611 | 16.0% |
| Hockey | M | 552,813 | 26 | 21,262 | 2.7% |
| Baseball | M | 364,567 | 34 | 10,723 | 1.8% |
| Basketball | W | 233,913 | 14 | 16,708 | 1.1% |
| Wrestling | M | 126,591 | 30 | 4,220 | 0.6% |
| Volleyball | W | 103,938 | 17 | 6,114 | 0.5% |
| Gymnastics | W | 91,333 | 19 | 4,807 | 0.4% |
| Softball | W | 83,526 | 23 | 3,632 | 0.4% |
| Hockey | W | 65,236 | 25 | 2,609 | 0.3% |
| Soccer | M/W | 58,860 | 28 | 2,102 | 0.3% |
| Track & Field / X-C | M/W | 43,366 | 49 | 885 | 0.2% |
| Lacrosse | M/W | 41,083 | 41 | 1,002 | 0.2% |
| Swimming | M/W | 31,986 | 30 | 1,066 | 0.1% |
| Rowing | W | 20,139 | 64 | 315 | 0.1% |
| Field Hockey | W | 19,299 | 25 | 772 | 0.1% |
| Tennis | M/W | 17,164 | 9 | 1,907 | 0.1% |
| Golf | M/W | 12,590 | 9 | 1,399 | 0.1% |
| Beach Volleyball | W | 8,536 | 17 | 502 | 0.1% |
| Totals per School 2025 | All Teams | $ 20,500,000 | 100% |
Football and Men’s basketball account for close to 90% of team specific revenues at most Power Conference schools, and athletes on these two teams will be the major beneficiaries of revenue sharing. While football receives the most revenue sharing per team, Men’s basketball has the highest average per player due to much smaller roster sizes (15 versus 105). These are averages per athlete. In actuality, a few players per team will receive substantially higher than the average, while many will receive much less. For players who see little if any playing time, their revenue share will also likely be minimal.
Revenue sharing is in addition to any third-party NIL compensation an athlete may receive. A new independent enforcement agency, the College Sports Commission, has been established to oversee compliance to the rules governing the annual revenue sharing cap, roster limits, and third-party NIL payments. An NIL clearinghouse (“NIL Go”) has also been created to assess the validity of all third-party NIL deals exceeding $ 600. The objective is to ensure that compensation is being made for legitimate NIL and not prohibited payments such as pay to play. Deloitte will be managing NIL Go and has reportedly shared data with athletic directors and coaches showing that 70% of past payments from NIL / booster collectives would have been denied, while conversely, over 90% of payments from public companies would have been approved. This is one reason (among several) why the influence of NIL collectives will greatly diminish in the upcoming revenue sharing era.
* Rosters sizes subject to NCAA limits beginning in 2025-26
Substantial increase in potential athletic scholarships for NCAA I athletes:
The NCAA recognizes that revenue sharing will primarily benefit athletes in only a few sports. To address this issue, scholarship restrictions on all NCAA I sports will be eliminated and roster limits will apply instead. This could create a substantial increase in athletic scholarships especially in non-revenue sports. For example, the scholarship limit in women’s rowing will increase from 20 to 68, in softball from 12 to 25 and in baseball from 11.7 to 34. Here are the new limits under the proposal:
| Scholarship Limits per NCAA I Sport | Team | Old limit | New limit | Increase Per team |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Men's NCAA I Sports | ||||
| Baseball | M | 11.7 | 34 | 22.3 |
| Basketball | M | 13 | 15 | 2 |
| Fencing | M | 4.5 | 24 | 19.5 |
| Football (FBS) | M | 85 | 105 | 20 |
| Golf | M | 4.5 | 9 | 4.5 |
| Gymnastics | M | 6.3 | 20 | 13.7 |
| Hockey | M | 18 | 26 | 8 |
| Lacrosse | M | 12.6 | 48 | 35.4 |
| Skiing | M | 6.3 | 16 | 9.7 |
| Soccer | M | 9.9 | 28 | 18.1 |
| Swimming | M | 9.9 | 30 | 20.1 |
| Tennis | M | 4.5 | 10 | 5.5 |
| Track / X-C | M | 12.6 | 62 | 49.4 |
| Volleyball | M | 4.5 | 18 | 13.5 |
| Water polo | M | 4.5 | 24 | 19.5 |
| Wrestling | M | 9.9 | 30 | 20.1 |
| Women's NCAA I Sports | ||||
| Basketball | W | 15 | 15 | - |
| Beach volleyball | W | 6 | 19 | 13 |
| Bowling | W | 5 | 11 | 6 |
| Equestrian | W | 15 | 50 | 35 |
| Fencing | W | 5 | 24 | 19 |
| Field hockey | W | 12 | 27 | 15 |
| Golf | W | 6 | 9 | 3 |
| Gymnastics | W | 12 | 20 | 8 |
| Hockey | W | 18 | 26 | 8 |
| Lacrosse | W | 12 | 38 | 26 |
| Rowing | W | 20 | 68 | 48 |
| Rugby | W | 12 | 36 | 24 |
| Skiing | W | 7 | 16 | 9 |
| Soccer | W | 14 | 28 | 14 |
| Softball | W | 12 | 25 | 13 |
| Swimming | W | 14 | 30 | 16 |
| Tennis | W | 8 | 10 | 2 |
| Track / X-C | W | 18 | 62 | 44 |
| Triathlon | W | 6.5 | 14 | 7.5 |
| Acrobatics | W | 14 | 55 | 41 |
| Volleyball | W | 12 | 18 | 6 |
| Water polo | W | 8 | 24 | 16 |
| Wrestling | W | 10 | 30 | 20 |
| Mixed / Coed Sports | ||||
| Rifle | Mix | 3.6 | 12 | 8.4 |
| Stunt | Mix | 14 | 65 | 51 |
| Totals |
The potential impact of these additional awards is massive. Under our calculations, NCAA I schools could award up to 86,212 additional “full-ride” scholarships. Assuming a value of $ 35,000 annually per scholarship, this would result in potentially up to $ 3 billion in additional scholarship awards per year – substantially more than the estimated $ 1.75 billion in revenue sharing payments.
But the actual increase is going to be substantially less than $ 3 billion. Scholarships awards are optional – a school can fully fund a sport or make awards less than the maximum allowed. Many schools already operate with roster sizes less than the NCAA limit, and they will have a new financial incentive to operate with smaller teams. And sadly, we’re likely to see cuts to non-revenue sports at many schools. Athletic directors are currently looking at a new reality where the costs of sponsoring a (competitive) non-revenue sport are likely to increase significantly, while the historical offsetting subsidy from sports such as football is being substantially decreased due to revenue sharing. There are likely going to be painful decisions to make about non-revenue sports at many schools.
Note: If a school awards additional athletic scholarships beyond the NCAA team limits in effect prior to House v NCAA, than the increased awards are counted as part of their revenue sharing pool up to $ 2.5 million per year.
The Front Porch … Why schools invest in athletics
College presidents often state that athletics are the “front porch” of a university … it’s not the most important room in the house, but it’s the most visible. Televised college sports are in part immensely effective infomercials – positively highlighting college towns, students, campuses, academic and research programs. Athletics keep alumni and boosters engaged, and are a very effective tool to recruit applicants nationwide. And this is supported by data. In a time when US college attendance is declining, NCAA I schools have shown healthy increases in undergraduate enrollments:
| First-time degree seeking Undergraduates 2002-22 | # of Schools | Fall 2002 | Fall 2022 | Total Increase | % Increase |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FBS - Power 5 | 64 | 253,517 | 369,141 | 115,624 | 46% | |
| FBS - Group of 5 | 62 | 160,030 | 209,266 | 49,236 | 31% | |
| FCS | 128 | 187,371 | 228,733 | 41,362 | 22% | |
| Other NCAA I | 95 | 140,560 | 182,995 | 42,435 | 30% | |
| Total NCAA I Schools | 349 | 741,478 | 990,135 | 248,657 | 34% | |
| NCAA II | 285 | 200,242 | 234,842 | 34,600 | 17% | |
| NCAA III | 437 | 233,594 | 261,314 | 27,720 | 12% | |
| Totals - All NCAA Schools | 1,071 | 1,175,314 | 1,486,291 | 310,977 | 26% |
* Enrollment increase is for full-time first-time degree seeking undergraduates applying in the fall term, for the 20-year period 2002 to 2023. Data source is the National Center for Education Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education. Here is how the 20-year first-time undergraduate enrollment increase breaks down by FBS conference:
FBS Conference Schools
20-year Growth rate *Average
Enrollment
Increase
2003-23
Pac-12 21,291 67%
American 14,347 59%
SEC 26,315 56%
Big 12 26,142 48%
Big Ten 29,848 42%
Mountain West 12,948 36%
Sun Belt 11,516 36%
ACC 16,853 34%
Conference USA 16,576 1%
Mid-American 13,320 -6%
* Average enrollment per school is total full-time undergraduates, Fall 2023. Conference membership is for the upcoming 2026-27 fiscal year.
Another key factor is the composition of the increase in undergraduate enrollment. Not only did FBS Power 5 schools increase their undergraduate enrollment by 46%, of this increase 69% were out-of-state applicants:
Composition of First-Time Undergrad
Enrollment Increase: Fall 2002-2022# of
SchoolsEnrollment
IncreaseIn-state
Applicants
out-of-state
Applicantsout of state
Increase %
FBS - Power 5 64 115,624 36,334 79,290 69%
FBS - Group of 5 66 49,236 29,157 20,079 41%
FCS 124 41,362 12,493 28,869 70%
Other NCAA I 95 42,435 25,587 16,848 40%
Totals - NCAA I Schools 349 248,657 103,571 145,086 58%
Why is this important? Because at most public universities, stated tuition for out-of-state students is typically about three times that for in-state. So not only did FBS Power conference schools have the highest increase in total enrollment over the 20-year period, they also had a big increase in higher paying students. FCS schools on average had a higher percentage of out of state students since FCS has a much higher percentage of private schools (e.g. Ivy League, Big East schools, etc.) that have historically drawn applicants nationwide.
How does athletics correlate with increased enrollment? A landmark study by Doug Chung of Harvard University determined that athletic success has a significant impact on a school’s enrollment demand. In a study titled “the Flutie Effect”, Chung determined that athletic success has a significant long-term goodwill effect on future applications as well as the quality of the applicants. And this conclusion appears to be clearly supported by real world examples.
The University of Alabama hired Nick Saban as head football coach in 2007. Subsequently, the Crimson Tide won six National Championships, and its enrollment statistics were also widely successful. From 2006 to 2020, Alabama’s first year undergraduate enrollment increased by 49% – over six times the average increase for all 4-year public schools during the same period.
The percentage of Alabama’s out of state undergraduate enrollment increased even more dramatically. In 2006 out of state students represented 33% of Alabama’s undergraduate enrollment while 67% were in-state residents. By 2022 – and after six national championships – these percentages had essentially flipped: 58% of the undergraduate enrollment was out of state while only 42% were Alabama residents. This is a major financial boom for the school, as out-of-state tuition at a 4-year public school is typically about three times higher than in-state tuition.
Another good example of the Flutie Effect is Boise State University. After a riveting Fiesta Bowl win over Oklahoma in 2007, the school saw a 40% spike in freshmen applications. In 2006 Boise State’s first year undergrad enrollment was 85% in state and 15% out of state. After the Fiesta Bowl win put Boise State “on the map”, non-resident enrollment steadily increased and by 2021 a majority of the school’s first-year undergraduate students (52%) came from outside of Idaho – a 250% increase in non-resident enrollment.
Schools are capitalizing on marketing to out of state students … it’s not a coincidence that Big Ten advertising pointedly emphasizes its coast-to-coast reach. While these enrollment trends are good for schools in general, there is also a downside. In-state students may find it more difficult to gain admission to these schools or obtain an affordable financial aid package due to increased competition from out-of-state applicants. Here is how the in-state versus out-of-state first-time undergraduate enrollment stacks up between FBS schools:
Total Full-Time Undergrad
Enrollment Mix - Fall 2022# % In-State % Out-of-state
FBS - Power 5 Schools 64 66% 34%
FBS - Group of 5 Schools 66 81% 19%
Resident students paying the lower in-state tuition account for around 81% of the full-time undergraduate enrollment at the Group of 6 schools, over 20% higher than the 66% in-state enrollment at Power conference schools.
There is a growing elitism in intercollegiate sports with valid speculation that FBS football is heading towards 30 or 40 schools concentrated in either the so called “super league” or potentially a couple of select conferences that operate independently. This would be immensely harmful for intercollegiate sports in general, and specifically to the schools that are actually doing the best job of providing affordable college educations. Hopefully the powers that be focus on the big picture of how intercollegiate athletics impacts the nation’s education system as a whole, rather than what simply financially benefits a relatively small group of big budget schools.
Summary of all NIL Collectives:
A few things you may – or may not want to know – about NIL Collectives.
Questions on our data? Contact us at: NIL-NCAA.com
Statistics compiled & edited by Patrick O’Rourke, CPA Washington, DC 